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SISTER WIVES: A NEW BEGINNING FOR UNITED STATES
POLYGAMIST FAMILIES ON THE EVE OF
POLYGAMY PROSECUTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
"Love should be multiplied, not divided," a statement uttered
by one of today's most infamous, and candid, polygamists, Kody
Brown, during the opening credits of each episode of The Learning
Channel's ("TLC") hit reality television show, Sister Wives.' Kody
Brown, a fundamentalist Mormon who lives in Nevada, openly prac-
tices polygamy or "plural marriage" and is married in the religious
sense to four women: Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn. 2 The
TLC website describes the show's purpose as an attempt by the
Brown family to show the rest of the country (or at least those view-
ers tuning into their show) how they function as a "normal" family
despite the fact that their lifestyle is shunned by the rest of society.3
It is fair to say, however, that the rest of the country not only shuns
their lifestyle but also criminalizes it with laws upheld against consti-
tutional challenge by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United
States.4 Consequently, the Brown family may be in for more than
1. See generally Sister Wives (TLC television broadcast) (Sister Wives airs weekly
on Sunday nights at 9 PM on TLC, and this statement made by Kody Brown ap-
pears in the opening credits of each episode).
2. See Who are the Browns?, TLC, http://tlc.discovery.com/tv/sister-wives/
about-the-show.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (providing background of Brown
family and discussing purpose and plot of show). For the first couple of seasons of
Sister Wives, the Brown family lived in Utah, but the family has since relocated to
Nevada. See, e.g., Jennifer Dobner, 'Sister Wives' Family Moves from Utah to Nevada,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK Uan. 19, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/fi-
nancialnews/D9KRFF980.htm (indicating family's attorney, Jonathan Turley, told
Associated Press that Kody Brown and family moved to Nevada).
3. See Who are the Browns?, supra note 2 (stating purpose of program is to show
viewers how polygamist family "navigate [s] life as a 'normal' family in a society that
shuns their lifestyle").
4. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding constitutionality of Morrill Act which
criminalized polygamy, because while freedom to believe is protected by First
Amendment's free exercise clause, freedom to act is not necessarily so protected).
"Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166. State
statutes use varying terminology in criminalizing polygamy, but it is important to
note that the terms "bigamy" and "polygamy" are used interchangeably today. See
Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity of Bigamy and Polygamy Statutes and Consti-
tutional Provisions, 22 A.L.R.6TH 1 (2007) (providing bigamy was crime of marrying
another spouse while prior marriage was still in effect whereas polygamy designated
act of entering into another marriage while prior marriage was still in force, al-
though distinction between two terms has been blurred today). Therefore, uses of
(249)
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they anticipated. Due to broadcasting their atypical lifestyle to the
rest of the country, Utah officials are now contemplating the possi-
bility of prosecuting Kody Brown and his wives for polygamy despite
their recent move to Nevada.5 This decision, however, is somewhat
anomalous since polygamy is not typically prosecuted without an
accompanying child endangerment charge.6
This Comment begins with an exposition of the background
and history of Mormon polygamy in the United States.7 It then ex-
amines the constitutional ramifications of polygamy, including free
exercise, right of association, equal protection, and due process/
right to privacy implications.8 The due process clause was also im-
plicated by historical challenges to laws targeting homosexual activ-
"bigamy" and "polygamy" in this Comment should be read to have the same
meaning.
5. See Dobner, supra note 2 (citing information from Utah County Attorney
that state will still consider bringing polygamy charges against Brown family de-
spite its relocation to Nevada). Utah treats bigamy as a third degree felony, and "a
person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the
other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person
or cohabits with another person." See UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010)
(detailing crime of bigamy). Utah has a four year statute of limitations for the
prosecution of polygamy, meaning Utah officials have four years from the date of
the Browns' departure from Utah to initiate charges against them since their mov-
ing out of state resulted in them ceasing to violate Utah's statute. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-302 (West 2010) (providing Utah's statute of limitations for felonies,
including third degree felonies such as bigamy).
6. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The Persistence of Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28,
1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1 9 99 /02/28/magazine/the-persistence-of-polyg-
amy.html (providing that no one has been prosecuted for polygamy alone in Utah
in almost fifty years);Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, "Sister Wives":
Will Reality Show Stars Face Prosecution for Polygamy in Utah?," FINDLAW (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20101004.html (stating Brown family
does not appear to violate other criminal laws often violated by polygamists, such
as child marriage, rape, or sex with minors, meaning state will have to determine
whether to prosecute Brown family for polygamy "in its purest form"); 'Sister Wives'
Bigamy Prosecution Would Be Rare, FOX NEWS (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.foxnews.
com /entertainment/2010/10/08/sister-wives-bigamy-case-stats-don t-I ie/ (stating
review of Utah bigamy prosecutions revealed no recent prosecutions for bigamy
that were unaccompanied by some form of child endangerment crime because of
lack of resources to prosecute all polygamists solely for crime of bigamy); Ben
Winslow, Utah Co. Prosecutors Want to See 'Big Picture' of Prosecuting Reality TV
Polygamists, FOX 13 NEWS (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.fox13now.com/news/lo-
cal/kstu-sister-wives-stars-investigated-bigamy,0,6323096.story (citing information
from Utah Attorney General's Office indicating that Office does not typically pros-
ecute polygamy alone because of lack of resources and instead opt to prosecute
polygamy only when accompanied by other crimes such as underage marriages).
7. For a further discussion of Mormon polygamy in the United States, see
infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 4 (providing citations to polygamy cases that
have involved aforementioned constitutional issues). For further discussion of the
constitutional implications presented by polygamy, see infra notes 78-93 and ac-
companying text.
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ity." Put simply, the Court reversed its Bowers v. Hardwick'0 decision
in Lawrence v. Texas" by concluding that laws targeting consensual
homosexual activity violate due process.12 Although only a few
years had lapsed between the two decisions, cultural and social
changes played a large role in the Court's doctrinal shift.'" An ar-
gument can be made that polygamy is the new homosexual sodomy,
meaning television shows such as Sister Wives and HBO's Big Love
that portray polygamy in a relatively positive light may represent a
turning point towards acceptance of the practice.1 4 Perhaps the
Court will again shift its analysis from upholding laws banning the
practice of polygamy to overturning them as an unconstitutional
violation of due process.' 5
9. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state stat-
ute criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct because there is no fundamen-
tal right to engage in such conduct), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (2003) (overruling Bowers by holding state
statute criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct was impermissible violation
of individual's due process liberty interest in making sexual choices free from gov-
ernment interference).
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. See id. at 578 (holding that Bowers was incorrectly decided and accordingly
overruled the decision). In reversing Bowers, the Court stated, "[t]o say that the
issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." Id.
at 567. For further discussion of Bowers and Lawrence, see infra notes 108-118 and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Diana Hassel, Lawrence v. Texas: Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine,
9 RoGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 565, 574-75 (2004) (indicating that cause of change
in Court's holdings from Bowers to Lawrence may have been increasing social ac-
ceptance of homosexuals since Bowers was decided in 1986); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1523, 1523 (2009)
(arguing successful advocacy on part of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender
("LGBT") movement played role in shifting public opinion towards acceptance of
homosexuality and ultimately in Court's Lawrence decision to overrule Bowers);
Christoper Lisotta, Courting Discrimination, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 13, 2004, at 28 (cit-
ing opinion that big difference between Bowers and Lawrence was increased social
awareness of rights that homosexuals were being denied). For further discussion
of Court's doctrinal shift from Bowers to Lawrence, see infra notes 119-141 and ac-
companying text.
14. For further discussion of polygamy's recent portrayal in the media, see
infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of Lawrence and its application to polygamy, see
infra notes 142-187 and accompanying text.
2012] 251
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II. POLYGAMY BACKGROUND
A. History of Mormon Polygamy in the United States
Polygamy in the United States has been practiced primarily by
the Mormon Church, although the practice is much more preva-
lent in other parts of the world.' 6 The mainstream Mormon
Church today, however, does not recognize the practice of polyg-
amy, and Mormons who still engage in the practice are members of
break-off sects.' 7 The Mormon Church, the Church ofJesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, was founded in 1830 by Joseph Smith, who was
the Church's "founder, prophet, and first president."18 The Book of
Mormon, the scripture followed by the Mormon Church, was re-
vealed to Smith in a series of gold plates, which he then trans-
lated.' 9 In addition to the Book of Mormon, Mormonism embraces
revelations given directly from God to Smith as part of the Church's
doctrine. 20
Polygamy was not an original tenet of the Mormon Church in-
sofar as Smith publicly condemned the practice in the early 1840s,
although there are indications that Smith secretly practiced polyg-
amy during that time.2' In 1843, however, Smith had his "Revela-
16. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) ("Polygamy has al-
ways been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until
the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of Asi-
atic and of African people."); Jonathan Turley, Polygamy Laws Expose Our Own Hy-
pocrisy, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
columnist/2004-10-03-turley x.htm (citing study that indicates up to seventy-eight
percent of world's cultures practice polygamy).
17. See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 53, 67-68 (1997) (providing overview of dissidents who broke off from main-
stream Mormon Church upon Church's disavowal of polygamy).
18. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POINGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 19 (Thomas A. Green
& Hendrik Hartog eds., 2002) (providing description of early Mormon Church).
19. See id. at 20-21 (describing Book of Mormon as providing "a concrete exam-
ple of divine intervention in the lives of Americans and the promise of the Second
Coming," which was revealed to Smith in gold plates which he translated into Book
of Mormon). Smith claimed that the plates predated other biblical manuscripts and
"were untainted by moral scribes." See id. at 21 (providing further detail of Book of
Mormon's origin). The angel Moroni led Smith in a series of revelations to a hill
close to his family's farm in which he found the gold plates, and the angel gave
him two stones, the Urim and Thummin, which he used to translate the plates. See
Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay's Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy, 1854-
1887, 13 YALEJ. L. & FEMINISM 29, 33-34 (2001) (providing history of gold plates).
20. See GoRoN, supra note 18, at 21 (providing that Mormonism includes
both Book of Mormon and direct communication that Joseph Smith received from
God in form of revelations).
21. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 31-32 (stating Smith issued formal state-
ments against practice of polygamy despite fact that he and some other "elites"
within Church engaged in polygamy).
[Vol. 19: p. 249
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tion on Celestial Marriage," in which it was "proclaimed that the
marriage of one man to more than one woman was justified' by the
example of Abraham."22 Polygamy became official Church doc-
trine nearly a decade after that revelation.23
Much of the Church's history was shaped by the legal chal-
lenges it faced in practicing polygamy, and in fact, it was the oppres-
sive legal restrictions imposed upon the Mormon Church
throughout the nineteenth century that led the Church to officially
abandon the practice of polygamy in 1890.24 Nevertheless, some
Mormons thought the Church was incorrect in disavowing the prac-
tice of polygamy and broke off from the mainstream Mormon
Church to continue with the practice, primarily settling in Canada
and Mexico, as well as in Utah and Arizona in the United States.25
Statistics reflecting the prevalence of polygamy today in the United
States are scarce because of its illegality, but it is estimated that po-
lygamy is still practiced by approximately two percent of the popula-
tion of Utah.26
22. See GORDON, supra note 18, at 22 (providing connection between Mor-
monism and practice of polygamy). Mormons believe that Christ's Second Com-
ing is imminent, and in order to prepare for that moment, there must be a
"restoration of all things," which includes "reinstituting biblical social relation-
ships." See Campbell, supra note 19, at 34 (providing rationale behind Mormon
practice of polygamy).
23. See GORDON, supra note 18, at 23 (stating polygamy remained secret for
approximately ten years after Smith's revelation with polygamy only being prac-
ticed by Smith and several other Church leaders); Campbell, supra note 19, at 31-
32 (describing Smith's revelation and its subsequent place as "one of the central
tenets of early Mormon doctrine" nearly ten years after revelation).
24. For further discussion of the legal restrictions imposed upon Mormons
and the Church's ultimate decision to abandon polygamy, see infra notes 27-49
and accompanying text.
25. See Chambers, supra note 17, at 67-68 (providing history of Mormon polyg-
amy, including overview of dissidents who broke off from main Church upon
Church's disavowal of polygamy).
26. See Julie Cart, Utah Paying a High Price for Polygamy, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9,
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/09/news/mn-43824 (stating polyg-
amy is still embedded in Utah culture, but precise statistics about practice are hard
to find with most information coming from investigators or polygamists who have
"left the fold"). See also Dobner, supra note 2 (estimating that there are 38,000
practicing polygamists in "Intermountain West"); Egan, supra note 6 (stating there
are at least four major polygamous clans in Utah with one such clan having an
estimated membership of 5,000 people); Grossman & Friedman, supra note 6 (pro-
viding that polygamous Mormons tend to live in small communities in western
United States, and it is estimated that 40,000 fundamentalist Mormons continue to
practice polygamy today).
2012] 253
5
McGinnis: Sister Wives: A New Beginning for United States Polygamist Famili
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
254 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
B. Prohibition of Polygamy: Statutes and Case Law
The first federal statute criminalizing bigamy was the Morrill
Act, which was enacted in 1862.27 The Act was aimed at combating
polygamy and provided that:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who shall
marry any other person, whether married or single, in a
Territory of the United States . . . shall . . . be adjudged
guilty of bigamy, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars,
and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years. 28
Additionally, the Act revoked all laws passed by the Utah legislature
that shielded the practice of polygamy from criminalization.2"
There was little debate surrounding the enactment of the Act,
thereby reflecting the staunch opposition to the practice of polyg-
amy within Congress during the nineteenth century.30 The Act,
however, was deemed to be ineffective in the late 1860s."' The inef-
fectiveness was due largely to the fact that Mormon juries in Utah
were unwilling to convict other Mormons under the Act, and the
Act required proof that the polygamist had married twice, which
was difficult to accomplish considering the lack of formal marriage
laws and records at that time.32
Congress' next attempt at regulating polygamy came in 1874
with the passage of the Poland Act.3 3 The Poland Act constituted
an attempt by Congress to rectify the significant shortcoming of the
Morrill Act, namely the fact that Mormon juries were unwilling to
27. See Morrill Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (codified at Rev. Stat. § 5352)
(describing statute as "an act to punish and prevent the practice of polygamy").
28. Id.
29. See id. (disapproving and annulling all Utah laws "which establish, sup-
port, maintain, shield, or countenance polygamy").
30. See Robert G. Dyer, The Evolution of Social and judicial Attitudes Towards
Polygamy, 5 UTAH BARJ. 35, 35 (1977) (providing insight into legislative history of
Act, including Morrill's statement that he presumes "there is no member of the
House who desires to discuss this measure" made while introducing bill to House
(quoting CONG. GLOnIe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1847 (1862))).
31. See GoRDON, supra note 18, at 97 (providing that Congress's condemna-
tion of Mormon polygamy grew in late 1960s and recognized that Morrill Act was
ineffective at outlawing practice).
32. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 38 (providing Act was unenforceable be-
cause it depended upon "Mormon juries to convict their own" and because of lack
of marriage laws making proof of multiple marriages difficult).
33. See Poland Act, ch. 469, 13 Stat. 253 (1874) (establishing purpose of Act as
regulating jurisdiction of Utah courts).
[Vol. 19: p. 249
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convict polygamists, by transferring jurisdiction of polygamy cases
to the United States courts.3 4 As one author on the polygamy issue
has said, "[s] uch amendments to jurisdiction and procedure were
not the stuff of sensation, to be sure, but they represented a signifi-
cant loss for Mormon juridical independence."3 5
Although the Poland Act was much more effective at regulat-
ing the practice of polygamy, it was the Morrill Act that was litigated
before the Supreme Court in 1878 in Reynolds v. United States. 3 6
Reynolds not only was the first polygamy prosecution to reach the
Supreme Court, but was also the first case in which the Court con-
strued the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.37 The
Court framed the free exercise issue as whether a religious belief
motivating an overt act, in this case the practice of polygamy, can
excuse such conduct from amounting to a violation of a statute
criminalizing the practice.38 The Court went on to acknowledge
that a law cannot be passed that prohibits the free exercise of relig-
ion, but it held that the Morrill Act does not violate that prohibition
because of the distinction between freedom to believe and freedom
to act or practice.3" To that effect, the Court stated, "[1]aws are
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter-
34. See id. (delineating those matters over which federal district courts would
have jurisdiction and providing that clerk of district court is to have control over
jury pool). See also GoRoN, supra note 18, at 112 (providing Act reduced power of
Utah's probate judges and allowed jury pools to be selected by federal court sys-
tem); Campbell, supra note 19, at 39 (stating Act "sought to facilitate polygamy
convictions by transferring plural marriage cases from the Mormon-controlled pro-
bate courts to the non-Mormon federal system").
35. GORDON, supra note 18, at 112.
36. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146, 161-62 (1878) (stating
Reynolds was charged with and found guilty of violating Morrill Act by engaging in
practice of bigamy, and one of Reynolds's grounds of appeal was that statute was
unconstitutional violation of free exercise clause).
37. See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoIcIEs
1246 (3d ed. 2006) (providing summary and significance of Reynolds).
38. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162 ("The inquiry is not as to the power of Con-
gress to prescribe criminal laws for the Territories, but as to the guilt of one who
knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a relig-
ious belief that the law is wrong.").
39. See id. at 162, 166 (framing issue as whether Morrill Act prohibits free
exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment, but concluding that Act is
constitutional and there should be no exception to its prohibition against polyg-
amy for those people who utilize practice as part of their religion). In fact, the
Court held that making exception for those people who practice polygamy as part
of their religion would place religious belief in a position superior to the law, "and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." See id. at 166-67
(explaining consequences of allowing religious belief to trump law).
2012] 255
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fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices."140
Reynolds served both to further the anti-polygamist cause and
give Congress the authority to continue regulating polygamy. 41
Consequently, Congress enacted the Edmunds Act in 1882, which
amended certain provisions of the Morrill Act.4 2 Not only did the
Edmunds Act prohibit polygamy, it also affected polygamists' politi-
cal rights in that no polygamist was allowed to vote.4 3 Additionally,
the Edmunds Act allowed attorneys to strike a person from ajury in
a bigamy prosecution if he practiced polygamy.4 4 Finally, the Act
attempted to resolve the definitional problem posed by the Morrill
Act by criminalizing cohabitation.4 5 In other words, because of the
aforementioned lack of formal marriage laws and records, tradi-
tional polygamy in the sense of having more than one wife was diffi-
cult to prosecute, and the Edmunds Act sought to rectify that
problem by criminalizing not only formal marriages to multiple
spouses but also cohabitating with multiple women.46
Finally, the 1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act served as the legislative
end to Mormon polygamy.47 The most important provisions of the
Act included (1) allowing for a lawful husband or wife of the al-
leged polygamist to testify in prosecutions for bigamy; (2) allowing
witnesses to be called in a bigamy prosecution without a subpoena;
(3) criminalizing adultery; (4) requiring that all marriages be certi-
fied; (5) initiating forfeiture proceedings against the Mormon
Church; (6) reaffirming the property limitations that the Morrill
40. Id. at 166.
41. See GORDON, supra note 18, at 121-22 ("[T]he opinion in Reynolds immedi-
ately and irrevocably raised the pitch of antipolygamy activism. . . . The opinion
reassured congressmen, lobbyists, newspaper editors, and husbands and wives in
the states that the marital structure they inhabited was indeed the very marrow of
the Constitution."); Campbell, supra note 19, at 42 (stating Reynolds allowed Con-
gress to more heavily regulate polygamy under Edmunds Act).
42. See Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1461)
(repealed 1983) (stating purpose of Act was to amend certain sections of Morrill
Act).
43. See id. (disqualifying any polygamist or person cohabitating with more
than one woman to vote at any election or run for public office).
44. See id. (stating it is sufficient cause of challenge to anyjuror if he practices
polygamy or unlawful cohabitation with more than one woman).
45. See id. ("That if any male person, in a Territory or other place over which
the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, hereafter cohabits with more than
one woman, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.").
46. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 43 (delineating how Edmunds Act sought
to rectify definitional problem posed by Morrill Act's criminalization of polygamy).
47. See id. at 50 ("Congress dealt Mormon polygamy its fatal blow with the
1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act.").
[Vol. 19: p. 249
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Act imposed upon religious organizations; (7) reaffirming the dis-
incorporation of the Mormon Church; (8) prohibiting women
from voting in Utah elections; and (9) invalidating any formation
of a local militia in Utah.4 8 Largely as a result of the serious restric-
tions imposed upon Mormon polygamy by this Act, the President of
the Mormon Church at the time, Wilford Woodruff, issued a decla-
ration in 1890 urging Mormons to refrain from entering into mar-
riages that are forbidden by United States law, namely polygamous
marriages.49
C. Polygamy Today
1. Portrayal in the Media
Although the Mormon Church no longer officially espouses
polygamy, some members of break-off Mormon sects continue the
practice today.50 This fact becomes apparent by watching TLC's re-
ality show, Sister Wives, which details the daily life of a modern-day
polygamist family.5' Sister Wives depicts the life of Kody Brown and
his four wives, Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn, and their six-
teen children.5 2 The family recently clarified its marital status:
Kody Brown's marriage to his first wife, Meri, is a civil marriage
licensed by the state, while the other three marriages are only relig-
ious unions that do not have state approval.5" This makes clear that
48. See Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 633, 660) (repealed 1978) (providing certain amendments to Rev. Stat.
§ 5352 [the Morrill Act]).
49. See GoRDON, supra note 18, at 220 (providing background regarding Wil-
ford Woodruff's "Manifesto" urging Mormons to cease practicing polygamy). "The
pain of resistance overwhelmed the Saints, their church, and their commitment to
legal difference. After four long decades of conflict, the victory was as eagerly
anticipated by most antipolygamists as it was dreaded by many Mormons. Mormon
leaders understood that survival and resistance had finally come full circle." Id. See
also, Campbell, supra note 19, at 51 (stating Wilford Woodruff issued his Manifesto
and thereby brought practice of polygamy to end among Mormons).
50. For further discussion on why some Mormons continue to practice polyg-
amy and its prevalence today, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
51. See Who are the Browns?, supra note 2 (providing background of Brown fam-
ily and describing purpose of show as depicting polygamous family that navigates
life "in a society that shuns their lifestyle"). See also, Inside the Lives of a Polygamist
Family, OPRlH (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Inside-the-
Lives-of-a-Polygamist-Family/print/I (providing interview with Brown family in
which Kody Brown said "they invited cameras inside their homes to dispel miscon-
ceptions about polygamists").
52. See, e.g., Inside the Lives of a Polygamist Family, supra note 51 (providing bio-
graphical information of Brown family).
53. See id. (providing interview with Kody Brown in which he stated that his
marriage to Meri was licensed by state but that family did not expect state of Utah
to recognize his other marriages). "'We weren't looking for the state to do that,'
2012] SISTER WIVES 257
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the family does, in fact, fall within the ambit of the Utah bigamy
statute, which criminalizes the act of purporting to marry other wo-
men while already having one wife.54
As previously mentioned, the Brown family lived in Utah but
recently relocated to Nevada, a move that technically should not
have any impact on potential bigamy charges brought against the
family by the state of Utah because of Utah's four year statute of
limitations.5 5 Consequently, although the family currently no
longer resides in Utah, Utah officials have four years from the date
of the family's departure to charge them with bigamy.5 6 Further-
more, while there are some reports that the Browns may have
moved to Nevada on the pretense that Nevada is a safe harbor state
for bigamy, such thinking would be incorrect as Nevada also
criminalizes bigamy, although unlike Utah, Nevada does not recog-
nize cohabitation as violating the bigamy statute.57 The Brown fam-
ily was well aware of some of the potential consequences of
he says. 'This is strictly a family unit, [and] we didn't feel like we needed that."'
Id.
54. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010) ("A person is guilty of bigamy
when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a hus-
band or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with an-
other person."). Based upon the statute, Kody Brown and his latter three wives
could all be subject to bigamy prosecution since the statute criminalizes not only
having multiple wives but also cohabiting with someone who is already married.
See id. (criminalizing both taking multiple spouses and marrying or cohabiting with
married individual). Prior to the Browns' marital status being clarified, commen-
tators posited that the Browns may not be guilty of bigamy if only religious mar-
riages were involved, meaning Kody Brown had to be civilly married to at least one
of his wives before they could be in violation of Utah's statute. To this extent,
Grossman and Friedman provide:
If even one of the marriages is a legal, civil marriage, then Kody and the
wives are probably guilty of bigamy under Utah's definition. . . . But if all
three were merely religious 'marriages' - and not marriages recognized
by the state of Utah - then Kody and his wives might be safe from prose-
cution. It is not a crime to engage in multiple, simultaneous cohabitation
as long as there is no civil marriage involved.
Grossman & Friedman, supra note 6.
55. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302 (West 2010) (stating Utah has four year
statute of limitations for all felonies and bigamy is felony of third degree under the
Code).
56. For a further discussion of the Brown family's relocation to Nevada and its
attendant implications for a Utah bigamy prosecution, see supra notes 2-5 and ac-
companying text.
57. See NEv. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 201.160 (West 2009) (providing definition of
bigamy). According to the Nevada statute:
Bigamy consists in the having of two wives or two husbands at one time,
knowing that the former husband or wife is still alive. . . . It is not neces-
sary to prove either of the marriages by the register and certificate
thereof, or other record evidence, but those marriages may be proved by
such evidence as is admissible to prove a marriage in other cases, and
when the second marriage has taken place without this State, cohabita-
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broadcasting its lifestyle (and its attendant violation of the law) for
the entire country to see, but it did not necessarily foresee a bigamy
prosecution resulting from its program.58 Nevertheless, that is the
state of affairs as they currently rest with the Brown family - contin-
uing to film Sister Wives in Nevada while Utah officials contemplate
bringing bigamy charges against the family.
HBO's Big Love is another television program that depicts po-
lygamy in a relatively positive light, although from the perspective
of a fictional family as opposed to a reality program.5 " The show
depicts the protagonist's trials and tribulations in handling the
drama with his three wives, his children, and his career as a state
senator.60 One practicing polygamist believes that the show is hav-
ing a positive impact on Americans' perception of polygamist fami-
lies and may even result in people's questioning the merits of
criminalizing polygamy.6'
Consequently, although the Browns are potentially facing crim-
inal charges as a result of their publicized violation of Utah's big-
amy law, their television program, in conjunction with Big Love, may
actually be achieving the Browns' goal of dispelling polygamy mis-
conceptions and could potentially represent the beginning of a so-
cietal turning point towards acceptance of the practice. At the very
least, the television shows are displaying a side of polygamy never
before seen, namely the side in which polygamous families function
tion in this State after the second marriage constitutes the commission of
the crime of bigamy.
Id.
58. See, e.g., Inside the Lives of a Polygamist Family, supra note 51 (providing in-
terview with Kody Brown in which he described his surprise at possibility of prose-
cution by stating that he did not expect criminal charges to result from his
television program). Nevertheless, the Brown family stands by the mission of their
television show, and Kody Brown recently stated, "'[w]e're just hoping that ulti-
mately . .. the fear of being prosecuted is less daunting than the fear of continuing
a society in secrecy and darkness.'" See Winslow, supra note 6 (detailing Kody
Brown's opinion on prosecution possibility).
59. See generally Big Love (HBO television broadcast). Big Love airs on HBO on
Sundays at 9 PM and is in its fifth season.
60. See Big Love: About the Show, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/big-love/index.
html#/big-love/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (providing back-
ground and plot of Big Love). "Bold, funny and wholly original, 'Big Love' contin-
ues to explore the evolving institution of marriage through this typically atypical
family." Id.
61. See Felicia R. Lee, 'Big Love': Real Polygamists Look at HBO Polygamists and
Find Sex, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/arts/
television/28poly.html? r=1&ref=polygamy ("This is making all of America say
'Why is there a law against polygamy?' . . . This guy is just trying to support his
family, and the family is just trying to make it." (quoting interview conducted with
polygamists during screening of Big Love)).
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"normally" without child endangerment and welfare issues accom-
panying their everyday lives.
2. Criminal Charges Brought Against Polygamists
Child endangerment crimes were at the forefront of the recent
highly publicized prosecutions of polygamists Warren Jeffs and
Tom Green.62 In fact, prosecuting the Browns for bigamy would be
unique in that their bigamy charges, presumably, would be unac-
companied by child endangerment crimes.63 Some of the
problems typically associated with polygamy, which were brought to
light by the Jeffs and Green prosecutions, include incest, child
abuse, wife battering, and child poverty.64 As Marci Hamilton, a law
professor, has said, HBO's Big Love "is getting a lot of attention -
but it plays fast and loose with the facts.""5 In fact, testimony from a
former member of Jeffs' community revealed that Jeffs "controlled
every aspect of the women's lives, including how they dressed and
what they ate. He also controlled whom they married and when.
'Age was not a factor.' "66
Warren Jeffs was the leader of a polygamous Mormon sect that
was located on the Yearning for Zion Ranch in Eldorado, Texas."7
After a raid on the ranch in 2008, Jeffs was charged with bigamy,
62. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Polygamist Sect Leader Extradited to Texas for
Tria4 N.Y. TiMls (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/us/02
jeffs.html (stating Jeffs was convicted in 2007 of two counts of rape for arranging
marriage of 14-year-old girl to her cousin); Turley, supra note 16 (stating Green
was alleged to have married thirteen-year-old girl, thereby allowing him to be pros-
ecuted for child sex crime).
63. For further discussion of the rare nature of prosecuting bigamy alone, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
64. See Cart, supra note 26 (providing interview with law enforcement officials
who describe how plural marriages operate and some problems often associated
with polygamous communities).
65. See Marci Hamilton, The Reality of Polygamy: Very Different From What's De-
picted on HBO's "Big Love," FINoLAw (Mar. 23, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/hamilton/20060323.html (criticizing polygamy's portrayal on Big Love).
Hamilton goes on to say that "polygamy rests, inevitably, on child abuse and neg-
lect. The numbers simply cannot lie. And to the extent it suggests otherwise, 'Big
Love' is really a Big Lie." Id.
66. SeeJames C. McKinley, Jr., Polygamist Sect Leader Convicted of Sexual Assault,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/us/06polygamy.
html?_r=1&ref=polygamy (providing testimony from former member of Jeffs's
community that was presented at trial for another leader of Yearning for Zion
Ranch, Raymond Jessop).
67. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 62 (statingJeffs was alleged to have founded
Yearning for Zion Ranch in 2004 as community for his polygamous followers, and
as part of polygamous practice, he arranged marriages between underage girls and
men of community).
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rape, sexual assault of a child, and aggravated assault.68 Jeffs was
convicted of being an accomplice to rape, but the Utah Supreme
Court overturned that conviction in July 2010 on the basis of faulty
jury instructions and remanded the case.69 After being extradited
to Texas, however, a jury in August 2011 convicted Jeffs of aggra-
vated sexual assault of a twelve year-old girl and sexual assault of a
fifteen year-old girl and sentenced him to life in prison for those
crimes. 70
As a practicing polygamist who lived in Utah, Tom Green was
sentenced in 2001 to a minimum of five years in prison after being
convicted of four counts of bigamy.7 1 Green had over twenty-six
children from five wives at the time of his court proceedings. 72 The
marital situation of Green is particularly shocking: no wife was
older than sixteen when she married, one of his wives was thirteen
when she became pregnant, his other four wives are two sets of sis-
68. See, e.g., id. (describing 2008 raid on Yearning for Zion Ranch); Polygamist
Warrenjeffs' Convictions Overturned, CBS Nvws (Jul. 27, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2010/07/27/national/main6717635.shtml (describing 2008 raid on
ranch and alleged activity that led tojeffs' criminal charges). During the raid, over
400 children were removed from the Yearning for Zion Ranch, and more than a
dozen men, includingJeffs, have been indicted on criminal charges such as bigamy
and sexual assault of a child. See, e.g., Hilary Hylton, Texas Polygamists Prep for Crimi-
nal Trials, TIME (July 26, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,85
99,1912477,00.html (describing raid and charges stemming from it). The children
were eventually ordered to be returned to their parents because of a lack of evi-
dence of abuse. See, e.g, McKinley, supra note 62 (discussing return of children).
69. See, e.g., Hilary Hylton, Will Texas Have Better Luck with Warrenjeffs?, TIME
(July 28, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2006999,00.
html (providing details of Utah Supreme Court's decision to overturn and remand
Jeffs' rape accomplice conviction). Jeffs was extradited to Texas, where his Yearn-
ing for Zion Ranch is located, in December 2010 to face charges of bigamy, sexual
assault of a child, and aggravated assault in that state. See id. (discussing Texas
extradition); McKinley, supra note 62 (statingJeffs was awaiting decision by Utah
prosecutors as to whether to retry his rape accomplice charge when Utah Supreme
Court decided it would not stand in way of Jeffs's extradition to Texas).
70. See, e.g., Court Releases Warren Jeffs Audio Sex Tapes, CNN JusTIcE (Aug. 12,
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-12/justice/texas.polygamistjeffs 1_war-
ren-jeffs-sexual-assault-fundamentalist-church? s=PM:CRIME (describing sex tapes
that Texas jury heard during Jeffs's trial); Dennis Wagner, Polygamist Sect Leader
Warren Jeffs Gets Life in Prison, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.usatoday.
com/news/ religion/2011-08-09-polygamist-sect-leader-warren-jeffs-life-sentencen.
htm (providing analysis of Texas jury's verdict in Warren Jeffs case).
71. See, e.g., Grossman & Friedman, supra note 6 (detailing Green's
convictions).
72. See, e.g., id. (providing background regarding circumstances leading to
Green's convictions); Terry McCarthy, He Makes a Village, TIME (May 6, 2001),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101010514-108793,00.html
(stating Green had five wives and twenty-six children with three wives pregnant at
time of court proceeding).
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ters, and Green was also previously married to the mothers of two
of his wives.75
The impact that the media had in publicizing Green's crimes is
undeniable. Green came to the attention of Utah authorities by
appearing on national television talk shows and candidly discussing
his lifestyle. 7 4 In fact, it was Green's decision to give an interview to
NBC's Dateline supporting his lifestyle that prompted Utah officials
to initiate charges against him.7 5 The Browns may face a similar
destiny in that their decision to make their illegal conduct public
may now result in a bigamy prosecution.7" In other words, their
decision to flout the law for the entire country, including law en-
forcement officials, to see may be the 'but for' cause of their cur-
rent legal situation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLYGAMY
Officials are well aware of the potential ramifications of prose-
cuting the Brown family for polygamy with one Utah official asking,
"[d]o we want to open this can of worms and maybe have some
court of appeals say this statute is unconstitutional? . . . Is this a test
case that we want to go ahead and take up?"77 Nevertheless, as this
official correctly points out, there are a number of potential consti-
tutional implications raised by prosecuting the Brown family for a
violation of Utah's bigamy statute, including free exercise of relig-
ion, right of association, equal protection, and due process right to
privacy.78
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, in relevant part, that "[c]ongress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
73. See McCarthy, supra note 72 (describing family situation of Green).
74. See, e.g., Dobner, supra note 2 (stating Tom Green came to attention of
Utah authorities by appearing on national TV shows); Grossman & Friedman,
supra note 6 ("[Tom Green] provoked local prosecutors out of their habit of non-
enforcement by appearing on popular talk shows touting their lifestyle and pro-
claiming a constitutional right to pursue it.").
75. See McCarthy, supra note 72 (citing information from Green's prosecuting
attorney that Green's interview with NBC in 1999 is what prompted Utah officials
to bring charges against him).
76. See Grossman & Friedman, supra note 6 ("Certainly, [the Browns] have
made it hard for local authorities to ignore their apparently illegal behavior, by
parading it on television for all the world to see.").
77. See Winslow, supra note 6 (providing discussion with deputy Utah County
Attorney regarding prosecution of Brown family).
78. For further discussion of these constitutional implications, see infra notes
79-92 and accompanying text.
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thereof."79 Reynolds v. United States, in addition to being the first
polygamy prosecution to reach the Supreme Court, was also the
first case in which the Court construed the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment.so0 In light of Reynolds, however, a free exer-
cise argument is unlikely to succeed because the Court drew a dis-
tinction between the freedom to believe and the freedom to act,
which means that while the government cannot interfere with relig-
ious belief, the government can prohibit religious practices stem-
ming from that belief.8 ' In fact, the Utah Supreme Court followed
the Reynolds line of reasoning in State v. Holm, 82 which dealt with a
polygamist's claim that the state's bigamy law violated his First
Amendment free exercise right (among others). 3
Although there are no Supreme Court precedents on the right
of association or equal protection in the polygamy context, the
Utah Supreme Court also discussed those issues in Holm.8 4 The
right of association is not explicitly mentioned in the First Amend-
ment, but the Court has held that the "freedom to engage in associ-
ation for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech [as
protected by the First Amendment]."8 5 Holm claimed that the
Utah bigamy law violated his right of association in that it restricted
his ability to teach his children, by way of example, the polygamous
lifestyle.8 6 The Utah Supreme Court, however, held that the state's
bigamy statute did not run afoul of the right of association because
79. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 1246 (providing summary of Reynolds).
For further discussion of Reynolds, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
81. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (making distinc-
tion between belief and action). In making this distinction, the Court stated:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot in-
terfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with prac-
tices. . . . To permit this [to allow practice of polygamy because of
religious belief] would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself.
Id.
82. 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
83. See id. at 741-42 (upholding Reynolds and viewing it as dispositive on
Holm's free exercise claim). The Utah Supreme Court's position on these issues is
relevant to the Brown family because their bigamy prosecution would likely be
brought under Utah law.
84. See id. at 745-46 (discussing Holm's right of association and equal protec-
tion claims).
85. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
86. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 745 (outlining Holm's right of association
argument).
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the right to engage in polygamous behavior is not a right protected
by the Constitution.87 In other words, the right of association is not
violated by the bigamy law because such a right extends only to
those associations that further liberty interests protected by the
Constitution, and polygamy does not constitute such an interest.,*
The equal protection clause with respect to state action can be
found in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in relevant
part, "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 89 The Utah Supreme Court in
Holm recognized that the equal protection clause requires similarly
situated individuals to be treated the same."o The Court held, how-
ever, that the Utah bigamy law is facially neutral with respect to
religion in that it does not mention polygamists or their religion
but instead "is designed to punish behavior regardless of the moti-
vations giving rise to that behavior.""' Consequently, the Court de-
termined that there was no equal protection violation presented by
criminalizing polygamy.92
The Supreme Court of Utah also addressed the application of
substantive due process to the polygamy context in Holm, but in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the
Browns (and other polygamists) can persuasively argue both that
Holm was incorrectly decided on this issue and that Utah's bigamy
law does, in fact, violate their substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.9"
87. See id. at 745-46 (holding no violation of Holm's right of association).
88. See id. at 746 ("Holm's right to intrinsic association has not been unduly
infringed upon because . . . the right to engage in polygamous behavior is not
encompassed within the ambit of the individual liberty protections contained in
our federal constitution.").
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 745 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)) (detailing requirements of Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause).
91. See id. (disagreeing with Holm that Utah bigamy law violates equal protec-
tion clause).
92. See id. (holding no equal protection violation presented by Utah bigamy
statute).
93. For further discussion of polygamy and substantive due process rights in
light of Lawrence, see infra notes 142-187 and accompanying text.
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IV. POSSIBLE PARALLEL BETWEEN HOMOSEXUALITY AND POLYGAMY
A. Homosexual Sodomy Laws and Development of Substantive
Due Process Jurisprudence
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court addressed the issue of whether
the right to privacy first acknowledged by the Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut94 extends to homosexual conduct.95 In Griswold, the
Court was confronted with a Connecticut law that forbade the use
of contraceptives.9 6 The Court held that the law was an unconstitu-
tional violation of an individual's right to privacy, which was
deemed to be a fundamental right. 7 The Court, however, did not
ground the fundamental right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process clause.9 8 Rather, the Court found such a right
to emanate from the penumbra of rights protected by the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments." Because a funda-
mental right was at stake, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the
statute at issue. Ioo Strict scrutiny as applied to a fundamental right
means that the government must prove that the statute and its at-
tendant interference upon an individual's right is necessary to
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (framing issue as whether there is fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy that is violated by laws prohibiting such conduct).
96. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (citing Connecticut law that criminalized act
of using "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception").
97. See id. at 485 (holding law to be unconstitutional violation of fundamental
right to privacy).
98. See id. at 481-82 ("[W]e are met with a wide range of questions that impli-
cate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some
arguments suggest that Lochner v. State of New York . .. should be our guide. But we
decline that invitation as we did in [other cases.]").
99. See id. at 484 ("[Sipecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance."). Justice Douglas, in writing for the majority, went on to say that a zone of
privacy is created by the penumbras emanating from certain amendments: the
First Amendment creates a privacy right in the sense that a citizen cannot be de-
nied his or her right to association; the Third Amendment's prohibition against
quartering soldiers also is a "face of privacy;" the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
of a citizen's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is yet
another aspect of privacy; the Fifth Amendment creates a form of privacy in that
the government cannot compel a citizen to incriminate himself, and finally the
Ninth Amendment states that the citizen has other rights despite the fact that cer-
tain rights are specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See id. (providing dis-
cussion of Court's penumbra analysis).
100. See id. at 485 (using word "fundamental" to describe privacy right at
stake).
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achieve a compelling government purpose. 0 1 The contraception
statute at issue failed the strict scrutiny test, meaning it impermissi-
bly interfered with an individual's right to privacy.1" 2 Justice
Harlan, while agreeing that the Connecticut contraception statute
violated a person's fundamental right to privacy, grounded his con-
curring opinion in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause as opposed to the penumbra concept utilized by the
majority. 1
Justice Harlan's Fourteenth Amendment due process ap-
proach in Griswold became the majority's approach in the seminal
case of Roe v. Wade.104 In Roe, the Court was confronted with a
Texas law that prohibited abortions unless the procedure was nec-
essary to save the woman's life. 1o5 In applying strict scrutiny to the
statute, the Court held that it infringed upon a woman's fundamen-
tal right to privacy, meaning a woman has a constitutional right to
abortion pre-viability, although the Court did conclude that the
101. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 797 (stating government must
show compelling purpose for statute and that statute is necessary to further that
purpose, meaning there are no less restrictive alternatives). By contrast, when only
a liberty interest is at stake (as opposed to a fundamental right), the Court applies
rational basis scrutiny to a statute that allegedly infringes upon that interest, mean-
ing the government only needs to prove that it had a legitimate interest that it
seeks to regulate by the statute and the statute is rationally related to achieving that
interest. See id. (describing rational basis scrutiny).
102. See Grisnold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. In explaining why the statute failed strict
scrutiny, the Court stated:
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means
having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law
cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this
Court, that a 'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities con-
stitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms.' Would we allow the police to search the sacred pre-
cincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the mar-
riage relationship.
Id.
103. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (agreeing with Court's ultimate
holding, but concluding that fundamental right to privacy lies in due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment). "While the relevant inquiry [into Fourteenth
Amendment due process] may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The
Due Process Clause . . . stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom." Id.
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. See id. at 117-18 (citing Texas law that criminalizes procuring or attempt-
ing abortion unless procedure is done for purpose of protecting mother's life).
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state has a compelling interest in banning abortion post-viability. 0 6
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court grounded the fundamental
right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. 107
Due process was first confronted in the homosexual conduct
context in Bowers v. Hardwick.10 That case involved police catching
two men engaging in homosexual conduct when the police entered
the apartment on an unrelated matter.109 Although he was not
prosecuted for violating a Georgia statute that criminalized homo-
sexual sodomy, Hardwick brought suit arguing that the statute
criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct was an impermissi-
ble violation of his right to privacy.' 10 The Court, however, dis-
agreed and instead held that homosexuals do not have a
fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy insofar as the
due process right to privacy does not include such conduct.' In
resolving this issue, the Court stated:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced
in those cases [referring to decisions pertaining to privacy
in family and reproductive matters] bears any resem-
blance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals
to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.
No connection between family, marriage, or procreation
106. See id. at 155, 163 (holding fundamental right to privacy includes right to
abortion, but right is qualified to allow for state prohibition of abortion after viabil-
ity because of compelling state interest in protecting prenatal life, although there
must be exceptions to prohibition if procedure is necessary for protecting mater-
nal health).
107. See id. at 153 (stating right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" regardless of
whether right stems from Fourteenth Amendment liberty or Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to people).
108. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (stating issue presented to Court was whether statute
prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy violated fundamental right).
109. See id. at 187 (providing brief factual background of case); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 37, at 866 (explaining police officer witnessed Hardwick engaging in
homosexual conduct after being led to Hardwick's bedroom by his roommate).
110. See id. at 188 (stating district attorney did not present matter to grand
jury but Hardwick brought suit alleging statute was unconstitutional). The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Hardwick and deemed the statute
at issue to be a violation of Hardwick's fundamental right to privacy that cannot be
regulated by the state pursuant to the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. See id. at 189 (providing procedural history of
case).
111. See id. at 190-91 (framing issue as whether there is fundamental right of
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and concluding there is no such right).
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on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
been demonstrated. 112
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court was faced with a similar fact
pattern as that presented in Bowers- a man was found engaging in a
homosexual act when the police entered his home based on a re-
port of a weapons disturbance." 3 Unlike Hardwick, however, Law-
rence was prosecuted for violating a Texas statute that criminalized
engaging in homosexual intercourse, and Lawrence alleged that
the statute was an unconstitutional violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection and due process rights.' "4 When the
case reached the Supreme Court, the Court reversed track and in-
stead held that the starting point in Bowers was incorrect in terms of
defining the right at stake." 5 The Bowers Court limited its framing
of the issue to the fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in
sodomy whereas the correct depiction of the issue is the liberty in-
terest that individuals have in entering into personal sexual rela-
tionships without fear of government intrusion." 6 In other words,
the proper framing of the issue is the individual's freedom to enter
into consensual sexual relationships without government interfer-
ence. To that effect, the Court stated:
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, stat-
utes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular
sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to con-
trol a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled
112. Id. at 190-91.
113. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003) (providing factual
background of case).
114. See id. at 563 (stating Lawrence was fined pursuant to Texas sodomy stat-
ute, and he filed suit alleging violation of his constitutional rights). The Court of
Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District rejected any violation of equal protec-
tion or due process and affirmed Lawrence's conviction. See id. (providing proce-
dural history of case).
115. See id. at 566-67 (determining Bowers Court's analytical starting point of
considering whether there is fundamental right of homosexuals to practice sod-
omy was incorrect).
116. See id. at 567 ("To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual marriage intercourse.").
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to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.' 1 7
It is important to note, however, that although the Court affirmed
the existence of a fundamental right to privacy, it did not expressly
use strict scrutiny to analyze the Texas statute at issue." 8
B. Impact of Social Movements on Court's Jurisprudence
from Bowers to Lawrence
In determining what led to the Court's decision to reverse Bow-
ers in Lawrence, it is important to note that societal changes oc-
curred between the years in which the two cases were decided that
resulted in greater public acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle.' '9
Although the justices of the Supreme Court are unelected and have
lifetime tenure, "their rulings, particularly on matters of broad so-
cial concern, respond to Congress, the President and public opin-
ion."12 0 William Eskridge, Jr., a constitutional law scholar, believes
117. Id.
118. See id. at 564 (concluding that case should be decided on basis of liberty
under due process clause and providing detailed analysis of Court's right to privacy
precedent beginning with Griswold). The Court, however, did not expressly deline-
ate a standard of scrutiny, as evidenced by its statement that "a law branding one
class of persons as criminal based solely on the State's moral disapproval of that
class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review." Id. at
585 (emphasis added). See also, CHEMERINSKY, Supra note 37, at 846 (stating Law-
rence did not articulate standard of review to be used or speak of fundamental
right, although Court did rely upon privacy right cases in which strict scrutiny was
used to analyze statutes at issue). For further discussion of the distinction between
fundamental rights and liberty interests, see supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
119. See, e.g., Diana Hassel, Lawrence v. Texas: Evolution of Constitutional Doc-
trine, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 565, 574-75 (2004) (indicating there was in-
creased societal acceptance of homosexuals after Bowers was decided in 1986);
Hutchinson, supra note 13, at 1525-26 (arguing successful advocacy on part of
LGBT movement played role in shifting public opinion towards acceptance of ho-
mosexuality); Christopher Lisotta, Courting Discrimination, THE: ADVOcA TE, Apr. 13,
2004, at 28 (arguing greater social awareness of rights being denied to homosexu-
als between Bowers and Lawrence). See also Turley, supra note 16 ("[T]his recent
change [referring to Court's Lawrence decision] was brought about in part by the
greater acceptance of gay men and lesbians into society, including openly gay poli-
ticians and popular TV characters."). At the time of writing this article, however,
Turley did not anticipate there ever being such societal acceptance of polygamy.
See id. ("Such a day of social acceptance will never come for polygamists. It is
unlikely that any network is going to air The Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy or
add a polygamist twist to Everyone Loves Raymond."). TLC and HBO's shows, how-
ever, may be proving this hypothesis wrong.
120. Hutchinson, supra note 13, at 1525 (explaining that despite justices' life-
time tenure, there are many outside influences that may shape Court's jurispru-
dence, including social movements).
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that social movements were critical in shaping twentieth century
constitutional law.' 2 ' Specifically, he suggests that social move-
ments were important in three respects: (1) in protecting perceived
threats to the liberty of their members; (2) in seeking to gain politi-
cal recognition of their group members and ending legal discrimi-
nation; and (3) in seeking to provide remedies for past
discrimination.' 2 2 To this effect, Eskridge stated, "ISBMs [identity-
based social movements] and their allies did not single-handedly
work these transformations [in the Court's jurisprudence], but they
have provided impetus and then support for judges when they have
moved in the direction of those stances."1 23 Darren Hutchinson, a
constitutional law professor, echoes Eskridge's sentiment in saying
that "[s]ocial movements are essential for the achievement of legal
and political change."124
Specifically with respect to Bowers and Lawrence, successful ad-
vocacy on the part of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender
("LGBT") movement led to greater social awareness of the rights
being denied to homosexuals under then-existing sodomy laws.' 25
This changed mindset eventually worked its way to the Supreme
Court in the Lawrence opinion.' 2 6 In fact, the majority itself recog-
nized that there has been an "emerging awareness" within society
suggesting that the liberty protected by the Constitution includes
the right of adults to decide "how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex."' 27 Although the majority indicates that
121. William Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Con-
stitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. Rv. 2062, 2064 (2002) (argu-
ing that "identity-based social movements" were critical in shaping Court's
constitutional law jurisprudence during twentieth century).
122. See id. at 2065 (providing that identity-based social movements were en-
gaged in three different kinds of politics: "politics of protection," "politics of recog-
nition," and "politics of remediation.").
123. Id. at 2066.
124. See Hutchinson, supra note 13, at 1525 (stating while social movements,
in general, are essential for achieving legal and political change, LGBT movement
was especially important in shaping society's viewpoint between Bowers and
Lawrence).
125. See, e.g., id. at 1526, 1530 (detailing advocacy of LGBT movement in time
between Bowers and Lawrence).
126. See id. at 1529-30 (explaining that "legal landscape" regarding homosexu-
ality changed by time Lawrence was decided). For further discussion of Lawrence v.
Texas, see supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
127. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (recognizing that al-
though historically homosexual conduct was not recognized and is still morally
abhorred by some, there has been growing trend or "emerging awareness" towards
acceptance of this conduct). In fact, the majority thinks that this "emerging aware-
ness" or "recognition" should have been apparent even when Bowers was decided.
See id. (stating awareness that liberty includes right of adults to choose their sexual
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this awareness was present even at the time Bowers was decided, it
references changes that occurred in state sodomy laws between Bow-
ers and Lawrence as indicia of even more significant societal changes
that occurred between the two decisions. 2 3 Specifically, while
twenty-five states criminalized sodomy at the time of Bowers, only
thirteen states criminalized such conduct at the time Lawrence was
decided with a pattern of non-enforcement among consenting
adults engaging in such activity in private.129 Furthermore, the
Court in Lawrence acknowledged that Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pa. v. Casey's0 and Romer v. Evans,'"I both decided between Bow-
ers and Lawrence, gave greater credence to the argument that
societal and jurisprudential changes suggest that family and sexual
relationships should be given greater protection under substantive
due process. 3 2
Social change has had an impact on the Court in terms of alter-
ing the course of its decisions in other contexts as well.'3 3 As Pro-
fessor Eskridge says, "ISBMs and their countermovements brought
relationships should have been apparent at time Bowers was decided largely be-
cause Model Penal Code, promulgated in 1955, stated "consensual sexual relations
conducted in private" should not be criminalized).
128. See id. at 573 ("In our own constitutional system, the deficiencies in Bow-
ers became even more apparent in the years following its announcement.").
129. See id. (providing overview of state sodomy laws and changes in criminal-
ization of sodomy and enforcement of such laws that occurred between Bowers and
Lawrence decisions).
130. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey dealt with a Pennsylvania abortion law in
which the Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade's general holding that there is a constitu-
tional right to abortion, but the Court, in ajoint opinion, abandoned Roe's trimes-
ter framework in favor of an undue burden standard. See id. at 873, 876-77
(abandoning trimester framework in favor of undue burden standard). With re-
spect to Casey and the Court's concern for protecting intimate relationships, the
Court in Lawrence stated, "[t]he Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
131. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declaring Colorado statute that repealed prohibi-
tions on discriminating against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals unconstitutional).
132. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 ("The foundations of Bowers have sustained
serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer. When our prece-
dent has been thus weakened, criticism from other sources is of greater
significance.").
133. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAlS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 77-79 (4th ed. 2009)
(describing NAACP's growing success post-World War 1I with challenging de jure
segregation in that government officials were now on board with questioning mer-
its of such segregation); Gerald Torres, Some Observations on the Role of Social Change
on the Courts, 54 DRAKiE L. REv. 895, 897-98 (2006) (stating litigation brought by
NAACP to dejure segregation laws in twentieth century was only part of solution to
ending dejure segregation with other part being mobilizing people behind their
cause).
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constitutional litigation that required the Court to apply old consti-
tutional texts and precedents to new circumstances, not just in a
single case, but in a string of cases that ran like a chain novel whose
audience shifted in the course of narration."' 3 4
The Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education13 5 is a
prime example of that notion.' 3 6 In fact, it can be said that social
change and social science data were really the only bases for the
Court's decision to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson'3 7 in Brown.' The
Court stated that the doctrine of separate but equal, first estab-
lished in Plessy, was no longer "supported by modern authority."' 3 9
The modern authority cited in a footnote, however, is nothing
more than a litany of social science studies and data indicating the
negative psychological impact that segregation had on black stu-
dents.14 0 Consequently, the fact remains that social change is often
necessary to precipitate a formal change in the Court's jurispru-
dence, which may be in the works for polygamy as a result of televi-
sion shows such as Sister Wives and the attendant change in
mindset. 141
C. Expanding Lawrence to Polygamy Context
1. Does Lawrence's Expansive Language Reach Polygamy?
Not only do homosexual sodomy laws and polygamy share the
social change similarity, but an argument can be put forward that
134. Eskridge, supra note 121, at 2065.
135. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 133, at 77-79 (describing impact social
movements had in preparing Court to overturn Plessy in Brown); Torres, supra note
133, at 896 (arguing social movements are critical in changing legal doctrine).
137. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
138. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 133, at 88-89 (implying Court failed to rely
on text of Constitution in overruling Plessy but instead relied on feelings of inferi-
ority created by segregation).
139. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (stating holding of Plessy no longer sup-
ported by modern authority because of psychological impact segregation has on
Negro children).
140. See id. at 494-95 n.I1 (citing social science studies from 1940s and 1950s
lending support to Court's conclusion that segregation has negative psychological
impacts on black children, including feelings of inferiority).
141. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 133, at 900 ("It is the movement that you need
in order to change the culture to ultimately make a rule shift."). See also Cham-
bers, supra note 17, at 72, 81 (discussing changes in Utah culture that have led to
greater social acceptance of polygamy, but yet polygamists are still denied protec-
tion under law). "[T]he families who live in plural marriages are caught in the
same anomalous position that gay couples find themselves in most of the United
States - no longer persecuted by the authorities . . . but not yet accepted as full
legal participants." Id. at 81.
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laws banning both practices constitute a violation of substantive due
process after Lawrence.1 42 As previously mentioned, the Court in
Lawrence determined that the liberty protected by substantive due
process includes the right of homosexuals to choose what sexual
relationships they want to enter into without fear of interference by
the government. 4 Although the narrow scope of the issue
presented in Lawrence was homosexual sodomy, the Court used
rather sweeping language that can potentially encompass intimate
relationships other than homosexual relationships. 14 4 Specifically,
the Court held:
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without be-
ing punished as criminals.... It suffices for us to acknowl-
edge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element
in a personal bond that is more enduring.145
Furthermore, the Court recognized that although the homosexual
lifestyle may be morally reprehensible to some, the imposition of a
singular moral stance vis a vis the criminal law is improper.14 6
142. See, eg., Chambers, supra note 17; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Sexual
Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1523 (2009); Gregory C. Pingree, Rhetor-
ical Holy War: Polygamy, Homosexuaity, and the Paradox of Community and Autonomy,
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. Poi.'Y & L. 313 (2006); Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free Exercise,
and the Constitution, 26 LAw & INEQ. 59 (2008); Cassiah M. Ward, Note, I Now Pro-
nounce You Husband and Wives: Lawrence v. Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Mod-
ern America, 11 WM. & MARvJ. WOMEN & L. 131 (2004); Jacob Richards, Comment,
Autonomy, Imperfect Consent, and Polygamist Sex Rights Claims, 98 CAL. L. REV. 197
(2010). All of the aforementioned articles undertake an examination of possible
parallels between homosexual sodomy laws post-Lawrence and polygamy.
143. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (stating that although
homosexual relationships may not be entitled to formal legal recognition, individ-
uals should have liberty to enter into such relationships).
144. See id. at 572 (referring to "emerging awareness" that liberty as protected
by Constitution includes right of adult persons to decide "how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex").
145. Id. at 567.
146. See id. at 571 (detailing history of homosexual sodomy laws but emphasiz-
ing that Court's role is to define contours of liberty as opposed to imposing major-
ity's moral viewpoint on society at large).
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The potentially far-reaching implications of Lawrence's lan-
guage were acknowledged by Justice Scalia in his dissent.147 In fact,
Justice Scalia specifically suggested that bigamy laws may be
deemed unconstitutional on the basis of the majority's holding.14 8
On this issue, Justice Scalia said, " [s] tate laws against bigamy . .. are
likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based
on moral choices. . . . [T]he Court makes no effort to cabin the
scope of its decision to exclude . . . [state laws prohibiting such
conduct as bigamy] from its holding." 49 justice Scalia's concerns
are echoed by constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky who
suggested that the majority's holding "more than any other case in
American history" provides constitutional protection to sexual activ-
ity as "a fundamental aspect of personhood."15 1 In other words, the
majority did not provide an explicit limitation to ensure that only
homosexual activity was encompassed by their decision, but rather,
the majority's language could be construed to encompass other
forms of sexual activity, including polygamy.
The Court, however, was careful to note that Texas failed to
put forward a legitimate state interest that could justify upholding
the sodomy law and intruding into private sexual relationships.615
It explained:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not in-
volve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitu-
tion. It does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosex-
ual persons seek to enter.152
147. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that language utilized
by majority could be used to render state laws prohibiting "bigamy, same-sex mar-
riage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity" unconstitutional).
148. See id. (citing state prohibitions relating to bigamy as example of laws
that may be deemed unconstitutional as consequence of majority's holding).
149. Id.
150. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 846 (describing potential expansive
scope of Lawrence Court's decision).
151. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating Texas statute did not further legiti-
mate state interest and as such, state's intrusion into personal sexual relationships
was improper).
152. Id.
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Had any of those concerns been implicated, it is possible that the
Court would have upheld the statute as furthering a legitimate state
interest.15 3
As previously mentioned, child endangerment concerns often
surround the practice of polygamy, and those concerns are typically
advanced as the interests that justify criminalizing the practice.154
Nevertheless, the fact remains that bigamy is a separate and distinct
offense from child endangerment crimes, as bigamy only requires
being simultaneously "married" to multiple people.'5 5 The fact
that bigamy is seldom prosecuted absent a child endangerment
charge suggests that polygamy in and of itself is not a crime that law
enforcement officials typically consider to be sufficiently important
to waste resources investigating and prosecuting.15 The Brown
family, furthermore, illustrates that polygamy and child welfare con-
cerns do not always go hand-in-hand given that there is no indica-
tion that the family implicates any of the welfare concerns that
often surround the practice. 5 7 Consequently, the state must ad-
vance some other legitimate interest in order to justify criminaliz-
ing bigamy post-Lawrence because, like homosexual conduct, the
practice of polygamy is arguably a "personal relationship that . .. is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals." 158
2. The Supreme Court of Utah's Interpretation of Lawrence
The Supreme Court of Utah had the opportunity to address
the potential extension of Lawrence to the polygamy context in State
v. Holm.15 9 Rodney Holm was a member of the Fundamentalist
153. See id. (suggesting that statute was overturned precisely because none of
these potential state interests were implicated).
154. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 65 (describing some problems typically as-
sociated with polygamy, including child welfare concerns).
155. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2010) (criminalizing bigamy
as knowingly marrying another person or cohabiting with another person while
either individual already has spouse).
156. For a further discussion of rarity of polygamy prosecutions, see supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Grossman & Friedman, supra note 6 (stating Brown family does
not appear to violate other criminal laws often violated by polygamists, such as
child marriage, rape, or sex with minors, meaning state will have to determine
whether to prosecute Brown family for polygamy "in its purest form").
158. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (using expansive language in hold-
ing Texas sodomy law to be unconstitutional violation of liberty protected by sub-
stantive due process).
159. See generally State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (2006) (involving claim that
Utah's bigamy law violated Holm's substantive due process rights under Four-
teenth Amendment).
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and was charged with
three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and one
count of bigamy.' 6o Holm married his first wife in 1986; he eventu-
ally took a second wife; and married his first wife's sister when she
was only sixteen.' 6'
Holm argued that the bigamy charges violated his substantive
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because, af-
ter Lawrence, Holm's conduct constituted a liberty interest pro-
tected by this Amendment.1 62 The court, however, held that Holm
"misconstrue [d] the breadth of the Lawrence opinion."'63 The
court concluded that the Lawrence decision was narrow in scope and
applied in the homosexual context exclusively.' 64 Furthermore,
the fact that Holm's behavior involved both minors and women
who may have been coerced into relationships to which they did
not consent implicated some of the concerns that the Lawrence
Court recognized as potentially legitimate state interests.165 The
court also suggested that the state had an interest in ensuring le-
gally binding marriages for the purpose of enforcing marital obliga-
tions, including spousal support and the prevention of welfare
abuse.' 66 As further support for its holding, the court suggested
that society's conception of morality was furthered by limiting mar-
160. See id. at 731 (describing crimes with which Holm was charged).
161. See id. at 730 (providing background of Holm's marriages).
162. See id. at 742 (stating Holm relied upon seemingly broad language of
Lawrence to support his substantive due process argument).
163. See id. (explaining that Holm misconstrued Lawrence insofar as he too
broadly interpreted its holding).
164. See id. at 74243 (holding that Lawrence is narrow decision that is applica-
ble only in homosexual context). To this extent, the court stated:
Despite its use of seemingly sweeping language, the holding in Lawrence is
actually quite narrow. Specifically, the Court takes pains to limit the
opinion's reach to decriminalizing private and intimate acts engaged in
by consenting adult gays and lesbians. In fact, the Court went out of its
way to exclude from protection conduct that causes "injury to a person or
abuse of an institution the law protects."
Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
165. See id. (suggesting state here had legitimate interest). In arriving at this
conclusion, the court, as previously mentioned, referred to language in Lawrence
that suggested the holding may have been different had state put forward some
legitimate interest for promulgating the statute, such as involvement of minor chil-
dren or potentially non-consenting people in the relationships at issue. See Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The present case does not involve
minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.").
166. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 743-44 (providing that legally binding marriage is
necessary before state can enforce marital obligations).
[Vol. 19: p. 249
28
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/7
riages to monogamous marriages.' 67 Ultimately, the court deter-
mined that there was a critical distinction between Holm's
polygamous marriage and the consensual sexual behavior ad-
dressed in Lawrence such that Utah's prosecution of Holm under its
bigamy laws did not offend any liberty interest.'6 8
3. Did the Holm Majority Get It Right?
The Holm dissent took issue with the legitimate state interests
that the majority found.'69 First, the dissent viewed the majority's
conclusion that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring legally
binding marriages as untenable. 170 Furthermore, the dissent ar-
gued that the conclusion that polygamous marriages are repugnant
to society's view of morality stands in direct contradiction to Law-
rence in that the Lawrence Court made clear that decisions cannot
rest on the justices' sense of morality.' 7 1 On this point, the Lawrence
Court said, "These considerations [moral and ethical convictions
held by society concerning acceptable behavior] do not answer the
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole soci-
ety through operation of the criminal law."172 In fact, the only po-
tential legitimate state interest that the dissent was willing to
recognize was the fact that Holm's polygamous marriage involved a
minor, which it viewed as sufficient to hold that Holm's due process
167. See id. at 744 (holding state has some control over relationships ). The
court stated that the State needs to have some power "over those relationships to
ensure the smooth operation of laws and further the proliferation of social unions
our society deems beneficial while discouraging those deemed harmful. The peo-
ple of this State have declared monogamy a beneficial marital form and have also
declared polygamous relationships as harmful." Id.
168. See id. at 744-45 (stating that case is distinguishable from Lawrence).
169. See id. at 777 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(disagreeing with majority's conclusion that Holm's due process claim is outside
scope of Lawrence).
170. See id. (stating majority's marriage rationale is problematic in that state
would be able to criminalize people for entering into same-sex relationships be-
cause state cannot recognize their marriage as legally binding, and dissent does
not understand welfare abuse rationale since people who are not in legally recog-
nized polygamous marriages are only able to receive welfare benefits available to
unmarried people).
171. See id. (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that majority ignores Lawrence proposition that state cannot criminalize conduct
just because it is repugnant to majority of people's sense of morality). The Law-
rence majority explicitly stated that the Court cannot use the power of the state and
criminal laws to enforce moral views upon society. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 571 (2003) (discussing idea that Court cannot legislate its own idea of moral-
ity). For further discussion of the morality language used in Lawrence, see supra
note 146 and accompanying text.
172. Laworence, 539 U.S. at 571.
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rights were not violated. 73 As previously mentioned, however,
these child endangerment issues do not have to go hand-in-hand
with polygamy, as the Brown family illustrates, meaning such con-
cerns do not amount to legitimate state interests in all polygamy
cases.174
Furthermore, the dissent considered Lawrence to have poten-
tially broad application and, unlike the majority, viewed the hold-
ing as applying to intimate relationships other than homosexual
relationships.' 7 5 Consequently, the dissent's view is in accordance
with Justice Scalia's concern expressed in his Lawrence dissent and
the statements of other scholars that Lawrence does apply broadly
beyond the homosexual context.' 7 6 The plain language of the Law-
rence decision further supports this view.' 7 7
The Browns' potential bigamy prosecution sets up a slightly dif-
ferent scenario from that presented in Holm in that the spouses in
the Brown family all married as adults (and ostensibly as consenting
adults). 78 As one of the attorneys who represented Holm stated, "I
think the prosecution of consenting adults for bigamy sets up the
test case."' 7" The attorney was referencing the distinction that can
be made between charging consenting adults who engage in polyg-
amy from the charges of bigamy accompanied by child endanger-
ment charges that were presented in Holm and other cases,
including those of Tom Green and Warren Jeffs. 18 1
173. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 778 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (agreeing with majority that Holm is unable to succeed on his due
process liberty claim because case involved minor, but stating that same result may
not apply in case involving relationship between consenting adults).
174. For a further discussion of the distinction between polygamy and some
of its attendant crimes, see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
175. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 778 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (stating that there is liberty interest in intimate relationships and gov-
ernment should not interfere with what occurs inside individual's home "as long as
it does not involve injury or coercion or some other form of harm to individuals or
to society").
176. For further discussion ofJustice Scalia's concern, which was echoed by
Erwin Chemerinsky, see supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
177. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (utilizing language suggesting that private,
intimate relationships other than homosexual relationships may potentially fall
within ambit of Court's holding).
178. For further discussion of the Brown family, see supra notes 51-58 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the Brown family.
179. Winslow, supra note 6 (quoting discussion with Holm's defense attorney
regarding differences presented in Holm and situation presented by Brown
family).
180. See id. (discussing differences between Holm prosecution and Brown
family). "The Browns could prove more problematic: they were all consenting
adults when they entered into a polygamous relationship." Id. For further discus-
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Finally, it is important to note that the Browns' potential due
process defense is supported by additional Supreme Court prece-
dent, including Moore v. City of East Cleveland.18' The Holm dissent
stated that Moore further supports the conclusion that there is a lib-
erty interest in intimate relationships, and "this individual liberty
guarantee essentially draws a line around an individual's home and
family and prevents governmental interference with what happens
inside," absent a legitimate state interest for regulating the relation-
ship.' 8 2 Moore involved a zoning ordinance that limited occupancy
of dwellings to members of a single family.' 8 3 Appellant Moore was
charged with violating the ordinance because she lived in a home
with her son and two grandsons, an arrangement which did not
meet the ordinance's definition of "family."184 Moore argued that
the ordinance violated her substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and a plurality of the Court agreed.'85
Specifically, the Court stated, "the Constitution prevents East Cleve-
land from standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."18 6 Consequently,
although not as on point as Lawrence, Moore is another opinion that
suggests that family and other personal relationships should be free
from government intrusion absent a state interest sufficient to meet
the Court's level of scrutiny.187
sion of the Green and Jeffs prosecutions, see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying
text.
181. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
182. See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 778 (2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (referring to other Supreme Court doctrine that finds
liberty interest in intimate relationships).
183. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-96 (providing description of zoning ordinance
at issue, which permitted only families to live together in single dwelling).
184. See id. at 496-97 (stating Moore violated ordinance by failing to remove
one of her grandsons from her home since her grandsons were cousins as opposed
to brothers, which meant Moore's living situation did not meet definition of family
provided in zoning ordinance).
185. See id. at 501-02 (holding zoning ordinance to be unconstitutional viola-
tion of substantive due process rights under Fourteenth Amendment).
186. Id. at 506.
187. See id. (holding in plurality opinion that State cannot mandate definition
of family unit). The Supreme Court has developed a significant amount of case law
recognizing a private realm of family life, which includes not only Lawrence and
Moore, but numerous other cases. See e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S 745 (1982)
(recognizing parents' fundamental right to custody of their children); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding unmarried father has liberty interest in cus-
tody of his children, meaning due process must be observed prior to terminating
his parental rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish par-
ents to be granted exemption from compulsory schooling for their fourteen and
fifteen year-old children on basis of free exercise of religion); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. U.S. 1 (1967) (holding right to marry is fundamental right); Skinner v.
2012] SISTER WIVES 279
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As the foregoing analysis suggests, the Brown family, although
currently facing potential criminal charges, may simultaneously be
ushering in a new social movement regarding more widespread ac-
ceptance of the practice of polygamy.18 8 In fact, Kody Brown and
his family filed a lawsuit in July 2011 challenging the constitutional-
ity of Utah's polygamy law in light of some of the aforementioned
constitutional concerns.'39 The Brown family illustrates that polyg-
amy does not always include the seedier criminal concerns that
have been problematic for polygamists in the past, and this message
is being broadcasted for viewing by society at large on their reality
television show, Sister Wives.190 Similar social movements have oc-
curred in the past with respect to other issues, including homosex-
ual relationships, and those movements and attendant mindset
shifts have had a marked impact on the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional law jurisprudence."'I Nevertheless, although there may be a
growing social trend towards acceptance of polygamy as manifested
by Sister Wives and HBO's Big Love, it is ultimately up to the Su-
preme Court to decide whether Lawrence's rather expansive lan-
guage should be extended to the polygamy context.
Kaitlin R. McGinnis*
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (deeming right to procreate to
be fundamental right); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus &
Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing liberty interest of parents to control up-
bringing of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing
liberty interest of parents to control upbringing of children and consequently in-
validating state law prohibiting teaching in German language).
188. For further discussion of the impact that television shows such as Sister
Wives may be having on society, see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
189. -See, e.g., John Schwartz, Polygamist, Under Scrutiny in Utah, Plans Suit to
Challenge Law, N.Y. TimEs (July 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/
us/12polygamy.html (stating Brown family filed suit alleging Utah's polygamy law
is unconstitutional violation of due process, equal protection, free exercise, estab-
lishment, free speech, and freedom of association).
190. For further discussion of Sister Wives, see supra notes 50-58 and accompa-
nying text.
191. For a further discussion of social trends and their impact on the Court's
jurisprudence, see supra notes 119-141 and accompanying text.
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., The
Catholic University of America, 2009.
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